Fiscal Capacity, Democratic Institutions and Social Welfare Outcomes in Developing Countries by Murshed, S.M. (Syed) et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gdpe20
Defence and Peace Economics
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gdpe20
Fiscal Capacity, Democratic Institutions and Social
Welfare Outcomes in Developing Countries
Syed Mansoob Murshed , Brahim Bergougui , Muhammad Badiuzzaman &
Mohammad Habibullah Pulok
To cite this article: Syed Mansoob Murshed , Brahim Bergougui , Muhammad Badiuzzaman
& Mohammad Habibullah Pulok (2020): Fiscal Capacity, Democratic Institutions and
Social Welfare Outcomes in Developing Countries, Defence and Peace Economics, DOI:
10.1080/10242694.2020.1817259
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2020.1817259
Published online: 12 Sep 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 49
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Fiscal Capacity, Democratic Institutions and Social Welfare 
Outcomes in Developing Countries
Syed Mansoob Murshed a, Brahim Bergougui b,c, Muhammad Badiuzzamand 
and Mohammad Habibullah Pulok e,f
aInternational Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Hague, The Netherlands and 
Coventry University, UK; bDepartment of Macroeconomics and Economic Integration, Research Center in Applied 
Economics for Development (CREAD), Bouzareah, Algérie; cDepartment of Macroeconomics and Econometrics, 
National School of Statistics and Applied Economics (ENSSEA), Kolea, Algeria; dISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
The Hague, The Netherlands, & Research Coordinator, Centre for Peace and Justice, BRAC University, Bangladesh; 
eCentre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE), University of Technology Sydney (UTS), Australia; 
fNova Scotia Health Authority, Halifax, Canada
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to gauge the various determinants of social 
sector spending captured by social protection and education spending in 
a cross section of developing countries, a subject on which there is scant 
empirical evidence. We hypothesize that fiscal capacity is necessary but 
not sufficient for resource allocation in this area, because the political will 
to do so must also be present. Using a panel data instrumental variable 
approach, we find that greater fiscal capacity robustly raises social spend-
ing in developing countries in the period 1990 to 2010. It is also strongly 
evident that rising democratisation enhances social sector spending; the 
presence of greater democracy and higher fiscal capacity could reinforce 
this effect. Our work also innovatively incorporates inequality into the 
analysis, finding that social expenditure is greater in more egalitarian 
societies. Military expenditure also appears to crowd out social protection 
expenditure, but not robustly.
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Introduction
The positive impact of social welfare programmes in areas such as poverty-inequality reduction, 
consumption smoothing, human development, and economic growth across various countries or 
regions of the world has been emphasized in the literature (Alderman and Yemtsov, 2012; 2013; 
Barrientos 2013; Easterly 2007; Gebregziabher and Niño-Zarazúa 2014). There is also evidence to 
suggest that social spending is on the rise in the developing world. But its implementation in 
developing countries is constrained by inadequate fiscal capacity. Among other factors, strengthen-
ing fiscal capacity has been identified as a crucial avenue for financing social protection schemes (ILO 
2014a).
There is convincing empirical evidence in favour of a positive effect of fiscal capacity on long-term 
economic performance, as well as a complementarity between fiscal capacity, state development, 
and institutional quality (Besley and Persson 2010; Dincecco and Katz 2016; Dincecco and Prado 
2012). In developed countries, greater social spending is supported by strong fiscal capacity in the 
presence of well-functioning democracy, which traditionally favoured redistribution given a history 
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of inequality. However, there is little evidence on the causal link between fiscal capacity and social 
spending across the developing world where the majority of the poor live. The objective of this 
paper is to investigate the causal relationship between the fiscal capacity of the state and its social 
expenditure, hypothesizing that fiscal capacity is necessary but not sufficient for resource allocation 
in this category. Consequently, we also investigate the role of democracy, the quality of government, 
inequality, and military expenditure in determining the amount of social spending.
In general, fiscal capacity is an indication of the level of development of a country’s fiscal system; 
in other words, a more general indicator of state capacity. It could be seen as a proxy for the 
government’s ability to implement complex policies (Rogers and Weller 2013). The relationship 
between fiscal capacity and social sector spending is more complex than it appears to be. First, 
fiscal capacity, by providing the necessary resources, directly allows implementation of social 
protection programmes which, in turn, ensure the provision of public goods for the poor in 
particular. Second, fiscal capacity is crucial for the creation and maintenance of a qualified and 
efficient bureaucracy, capable of implementing government policies and programmes. Finally, 
robust fiscal capacity, along with effective constraints on the executive, is also indicative of 
a functional bargain between the state and the economic elites, which not only facilitates taxing 
the higher income group but also can promote the implementation and success of policies (Papadia 
2016). Developing countries systematically seem to have lower fiscal capacity and smaller govern-
ment size relative to developed countries and emerging economies (see Table 1). A weaker fiscal 
capacity diminishes state capacity in its multifarious functions, including social welfare spending.
We aim to advance our understanding of the determinants of social spending by examining the 
causal relationship between fiscal capacity and social welfare expenditure, along with the role of 
politics in a cross-section of developing countries from 1990 to 2010. Additionally, we examine the 
relation between the degree of social spending and inequality. Our analysis pertains to both fiscal 
capacity and the political will to spend public money in this direction. We employ panel data 
instrumental variables (IV) methods to address endogeneity problems in estimating the causal 
Table 1. State capacity in selected OECD and non-OECD countries in 2010.
Country Total tax to GDP ratio Government expenditure to GDP ratio Social protection expenditure to GDP ratio
OECD countries
United Kingdom 32.22 46.33 23.56
Germany 35.01 47.87 25.89
Japan 26.48 39.01 16.23
Australia 26.30 36.77 18.16
Canada 31.01 43.82 18.14
Sweden 43.17 50.63 27.56
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 29.07 38.78 18.13
Bangladesh 7.29 14.59 2.69
Brazil 33.60 39.44 21.29
China 22.52 22.47 6.83
Congo. Dem. Rep. 8.89 31.58 3.71
Ecuador 12.64 35.65 4.37
India 16.90 27.98 2.64
Indonesia 9.67 18.23 2.63
Kenya 15.73 29.66 2.61
Malaysia 13.30 28.53 2.89
Morocco 22.82 31.9 6.57
Peru 15.33 20.27 6.85
Senegal 14.88 27.18 5.34
South Africa 27.00 32.31 9.79
Uganda 9.24 19.69 3.46
Viet Nam 19.19 33.06 6.28
Note: OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on GRD (2019) and ILO (2014a) data.
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impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare expenditure. We also control for relevant covariates found 
in the literature and carry out robustness checks on our main results.
Our findings suggest that greater fiscal capacity robustly raises social spending, along with higher 
per capita income, whereas greater external debt servicing inhibits this category of expenditure. 
Rising democratization enhances social sector spending; the presence of greater democracy and 
higher fiscal capacity could reinforce this effect. We also find that more equal societies spend more 
on social protection, and military expenditure can weakly crowd out certain types of social sector 
expenditure, once we control for inequality and democracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of our investigation; section 3 outlines our model specification, data, and econo-
metric strategy; section 4 presents our econometric results; and finally, section 5 contains some 
conclusions.
Theoretical and Empirical Underpinnings
We first turn to the economic rationale for social welfare, which essentially revolves around the 
debate about the nexus between income and wealth inequality and economic growth, as well as the 
political will to effect redistribution via social welfare expenditures.1
The developing world has made major strides in reviving growth and poverty reduction since the 
beginning of the new millennium. But major concerns remain about groups that are being left 
behind in this march towards greater prosperity. This includes the growing tide of inequality 
throughout the world during our present era of globalization (Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012), with 
some temporary exceptions in selected Latin American countries. The chief misgivings regarding 
these developments are to do with the income and wealth share of the richest 1% or 10% of the 
population. If we take a truly cosmopolitan view, treating the entire planet as a single entity, global 
inequality may have declined by about 2% Gini points between 1988 and 2008 to around 70.5 
(Lakner and Milanovic 2015), but this finding, as the authors point out, may mask the serious 
underestimation of the income of the top decile in the income distribution, who are often missed 
out in household surveys. Jorda and Niño-Zarazúa (2019) indicate that once the missing income of 
the richest is taken into account (using tax records in selected countries) the global income 
distribution looks different, and global inequality estimates based on household surveys alone 
have a downward bias of 15–42%, especially for low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Accompanying this rise in inequality has been the increased informalization of work, combined 
with the growth of vulnerable jobs without regulatory protection and social insurance (ILO 2014b). In 
addition, the wealth share of the richest 1% in the world is greater than the rest of the population’s 
(99%) total wealth, according to some sources (Oxfam 2016); according to Credit Suisse (2010) less 
than 1% of the richest in the world own more than one-third of the world’s wealth. The power thus 
conveyed is bound to impact on policy-making, particularly on tax policies that permit the richest to 
pay lower taxes on their wealth, as well as preventing policy coordination between nations to 
prevent tax avoidance. The political influence of the wealthy is growing, as remarked upon by 
Stiglitz (2012), and a recent Oxfam (2016) report.
Our first concern is with the efficiency aspects of the growth and inequality relationship, and 
hence, indirectly, the merits of social welfare in redressing inequality. Classical and neoclassical 
growth theories emphasized the role of saving (invested in productive capacity), chiefly by the 
owners of capital, in generating growth. In this connection, a greater degree of inequality may 
accompany initial growth spurts, as exemplified by the famous Kuznets (1955) hypothesis about the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and per capita income. As growth 
accelerates, inequality first rises, but after reaching a certain peak in average income, inequality 
begins to decline. This pattern certainly explains the growth history of the earliest industrialized 
nations, such as the UK and the USA, as demonstrated by Kuznets (1955). Since the 1980s, however, 
inequality is widely regarded to be on the increase again in most advanced industrialized nations. 
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Inequality can facilitate greater economic growth if capitalists are more innovative and save a greater 
proportion of their income compared to other classes (Kaldor 1957). But this may not apply if the 
greater inequality is a result of the acquisition of a rent by the highest income earners, rather than 
returns from productive investment in manufacturing, as is the case for much of the financial 
investments of the wealthiest at present (see Orhangazi 2008 on financialization). Moreover, the 
Kuznets relationship does not seem to hold for the post-Second World War growth experiences in 
East Asia (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). In contrast with the theories of growth embodying exogenous 
technical progress, endogenous growth theories highlight the importance of human capital in 
promoting growth, thus implying the positive role of publicly funded education. Easterly (2007) 
demonstrates that a higher middle class share of income does promote growth, because the middle 
classes traditionally clamour for more growth-enhancing public goods, including publicly funded 
education and health care.
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides (2014) show that the recent growth 
experiences of a cross-section of developed and developing countries suggest that inequality is 
harmful to growth prospects. This could be because greater inequality leaves economies more prone 
to financial crises,2 greater inequality results in less human capital accumulation, and because 
inequality contains within it the seeds of conflict, which is harmful for growth. On the causes of 
recent rises in income inequality, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) point out that unskilled labour-saving 
technical progress, financial globalization (but not trade openness), and less regulation of labour 
markets, including the informalization of work, are the chief culprits.
In empirical models, redistributive policies, including social expenditures, appear to no longer 
harm growth prospects (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014) in recent years across countries. 
Traditionally, it was believed that greater government consumption was negatively correlated 
with growth (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001), because of crowding-out effects and distortions to 
incentives. Thus, redistributive policies financed by taxation were distortion-inducing, even when 
they resulted in greater equity and social justice. Economic efficiency and equity needed to be 
separated, and furthermore, there was an efficiency–equity trade-off (see Okun 1975), empirical 
evidence for which seems to have weakened in recent years, linked, among other phenomena, to 
new forms of market failure.
Market failures emanating from credit and labour market imperfections can result in harmful 
inequality, justifying intervention and redistribution. Among such failures is the presence of adverse 
selection (Stiglitz 2012), which makes the competitive equilibrium and its associated income dis-
tribution no longer Pareto optimal. Adverse selection in credit and labour markets can lead to 
inefficient outcomes for the economy that also exacerbate both poverty and inequality, as the poor 
are credit rationed, have less access to education, and experience disproportionate downward 
pressure on their real wages. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) built the seminal analytical model of credit 
rationing with adverse selection, which disadvantages the poor and is of considerable empirical and 
policy relevance in developing countries. Bénabou and Tirole (2013) construct an analytical model of 
excessive bonus pay for the skilled, and under-incentivization of the low paid, with substantial 
welfare losses for the economy.
Traditional arguments against excessive inequality were grounded in purely ‘equity’ considera-
tions based on society’s aversion to highly unequal outcomes. A modicum of unequal outcomes as 
a reward for differential effort, talent and risk-taking can be regarded as fair, but what is both unjust 
and inefficient is inequality of opportunity (Roemer 1998). This may be rooted in either systematic 
discrimination or unequal access to opportunities, such as education. It can be argued that 
present day trends in the distribution of income, with the accelerating share of the top 1% in the 
global income distribution, do produce inequality of opportunity and hamper intergenerational 
mobility, particularly because much of the wealth of the wealthiest is principally attributable to a rent 
earned from speculative financial investments. In the ultimate analysis, in the presence of many 
market imperfections, adverse selection, substantial economic rents, and inequality of opportunity, 
the separability between the efficiency and equity arguments against inequality cannot be 
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maintained, but above all make social protection and redistributive policies justifiable. 
Gebregziabher and Niño-Zarazúa (2014) present evidence to suggest that social spending improves 
the inequality-adjusted human development index of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and public health expenditure reduces child mortality.
Where there is a distributive conflict between the haves and the have nots, a high degree of 
inequality may damage future growth prospects (Alesina and Rodrik 1994), thus explaining the 
redistributive policies pursued after the Second World War in North-East Asia (particularly with 
regard to land redistribution) prior to these countries’ growth spurt, and the absence of a Kuznets 
relation there. Rodrik (1999) argues that social conflict measured by indicators such as inequality, 
unless managed by well-functioning institutions, can lead to growth collapses. In other words, 
persistent inequality destabilizes society and the social contract; this may produce social conflict, 
even if it is not full-blown armed conflict.3
Another crucial determinant of social spending is the state’s commitment to inequality reduc-
tion. It has been suggested that higher per capita income is associated with more fiscal capacity, 
but social spending does not always go up accordingly, being a matter of politics also. Table 1 
indicates that richer countries tend to have greater tax capacity and more social protection 
spending; among developing countries, low-income nations have lesser fiscal capacity, and 
lower social protection expenditure, compared to middle-income countries like Argentina and 
Brazil. South Africa has more fiscal capacity and greater social protection expenditure compared to 
the rest of the sub-Saharan region, both due to its relative affluence and its unique political history. 
Ghana has greater social sector spending as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) than 
India in 2010, even though India’s revenues and government spending are greater, due to India’s 
higher military expenditure. Similarly, the Congo, despite having substantial fiscal capacity by 
regional standards, has lower social sector spending. Therefore, the capacity to spend in this 
direction needs to be reinforced by political will, and the right admixture of institutions and 
political competition.
This leads us to political economy considerations, as the choice and implementation of policies by 
the state are fundamentally the outcome of strategic interaction between different factions with 
different interests. The pressure for redistribution results in the initial democratic contract (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2009), with some power transferred to the less affluent and consequently some 
redistribution. Downs (1957) famous median voter theory suggests that the median voter’s prefer-
ences prevail in a democracy. Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that increases in the size of 
government in democracies are due to median voter pressure for redistribution. This is either due 
to the extension of the franchise (which lowers the median voter’s income relative to the national 
mean income) or occurs when economic growth or transformation raises the average or mean 
income above that of the median voter, implying greater inequality. Dodlova and Giolbas (2016) find 
some evidence supporting the Meltzer and Richard (1981) median voter thesis, but encounter 
difficulties in satisfactorily identifying the link between changes in inequality and redistributive 
transfers.
The hypothesis that increased democracy brings forth greater social sector spending in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is borne out by findings in Snyder and Yackovlev (2000), Mayoral and 
Nabernegg (n.d.), but less strongly in Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2004), particularly during 
democratic transitions (when political inclusion is rising), and especially for expenditure on health 
and education relative to social welfare per se. Shonchoy (2010), while analysing total government 
expenditure in developing countries, also finds total spending positively related to democracy. 
Dodlova and Lay (2016) argue that democracies, compared to autocracies, are more likely to institute 
pro-poor transfers; autocracies provide social welfare mainly as a response to revolutionary threats. 
Programmes under autocracies, however, are likely to be less conditional and attract larger budgets. 
Egger, Radulescu, and Strecker (2016) demonstrate that, besides political factors, there may also be 
geographical spread from one country to another of social welfare type expenditures via 
a demonstration effect throughout history; this mechanism may account for its recent emergence 
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or surge in developing countries, particularly in Latin America. Arguably, the fragility of social 
spending in the advanced economies that are also democracies in our recent age of globalization 
is due to the strengthening of the political clout of the wealthy, as well as the breakdown of earlier 
redistributive social contracts and median voter power.4
A related issue concerns military expenditures in developing countries. These have been found to 
be a mixed blessing; see Deger and Sen (1995). Does military expenditure crowd out social sector 
spending of all types, or is there a complementarity between certain categories of military and social 
sector spending, such as on education. For a panel of developed 29 OECD countries, Lin, Ali, and Lu 
(2015) find that military expenditure does not crowd out social sector expenditure. Kollias and 
Paleologou (2011) find a similar result for Greece. But for developing countries that are more fiscally 
constrained, a different outcome is possible.
In summary, a degree of social welfare is necessary to avoid distributive and social conflicts, 
particularly with greater globalization and when the tide of inequality is on the rise. As far as the 
determinants of social spending are concerned, it is predicated both on economic capacity – the 
fiscal capacity of the state – as well as political factors, which are chiefly about how the state and 
society respond to inequality and poverty, but also related to how well the state functions (the 
quality of governance). Thus, both economic capacity and political will, the two ingredients making 
up state capacity, determine the existence and extent of social welfare expenditures.
Model Specification and Econometric Methods5
Model Specification and Data
Our empirical hypothesis is that social spending is a function of state capacity: which has economic 
and political dimensions. To investigate primarily the impact of fiscal capacity and institutions on the 
allocation of social sector spending, we make use of a panel dataset comprised of 84 developing 
countries from 1990 to 2010.
Many previous studies have considered social protection or education expenditures as a proxy to 
social spending (Kollias and Paleologou 2011; Gassman, Mohnen, and Vinci 2016). However, we 
distinguish our study from much of previous empirical work by taking a broader definition of social 
spending to include government spending on social protection, education (Haile and Niño-Zarazúa, 
2018). This will give us insight into what aspect of social sector spending, fiscal policy and democratic 
institutions have the most impact.
The social protection expenditures data are taken from the ILO database contained in a report 
(ILO 2014a) because it has maximum country coverage over time for developing countries. This data 
source has cross-country comparable data for public expenditure on social protection, poverty 
alleviation programmes and health; it is also utilized as the dependent variable in the cross- 
country study by Gassman, Mohnen, and Vinci (2016).6 Data on this variable are only available for 
every five-year interval point during the period 1990–2010, which entails five observation points. 
Matching the dependent variable, we take five-year average of our data on other explanatory and 
control variables. As this data base does not include public spending on education, we estimate the 
determinants of education separately to get a more complete picture of non-security sector public 
expenditure. The education expenditures data are drawn from the UNESCO databases. We use 
government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.
To be more specific in carrying out econometric estimation, we estimate several models to 
examine our hypotheses. On the fiscal capacity side, our first hypothesis is that the extent of social 
sector spending depends upon the resources available to the state in which we are interested in 
looking at the causal relationship between these two variables. To this end, following to Dincecco 
and Prado (2012), our preferred proxy for fiscal capacity is the total tax to GDP ratio plus grants. In 
contrast with Besley and Persson (2009), we consider all types of taxes since the share of direct taxes 
in total revenues of developing taxes is still small, even if it is increasing. Including grants is 
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appropriate because certain types of public expenditure, on health and education in particular, are 
mandated by aid donors, and this is effected via direct budgetary support in many developing 
countries. Hence, grants of these types are meant to boost fiscal capacity. Excluding grants, however, 
from the definition of fiscal capacity does not alter our results, except marginally. We have excluded 
the natural resource tax revenues as these revenues are a bounty of nature and are not part of the 
political and societal build-up of fiscal capacity. The tax to GDP ratio were collected from 
Government Revenue Dataset (GRD). As alternatives, in our robustness checks, we consider Total 
Tax to GDP ratio from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Total tax to GDP ratio from 
the Government Financial Statistics database of the IMF (n.d.), Direct taxes to GDP ratio and Income 
tax to GDP ratio from Government Revenue Dataset (GRD2019) as proxies.
Although fiscal capacity is in principle correlated with GDP per capita growth, as this is not always 
the case, we include GDP per capita growth as a control variable for the size of the economy. When 
GDP per capita growth rises beyond a certain point, social sector spending can rise more than 
proportionately, as in the case of OECD countries. The resources available to the state may be 
(substantially) diminished by the burden of servicing debt incurred in the past; to this end, we 
incorporate debt servicing to national income ratios as an explanatory variable. An additional 
variable of interest may be growth in population, which may be an indication of increasing 
dependency and a growing labour force. This may result in the growth of GDP, but if social spending 
does not rise proportionately, it will have a negative impact on our dependent variable.
The first, as well as our base model, takes the following form: 
Yit ¼ β0 þ β1Fit þ β1Xit þ uit 1ð Þ
In equation (1), i and t indicate country and year, respectively, Yit stands for public expenditure on 
social welfare. Fit is our main variable of interest, fiscal capacity (defined as total non-resource taxes 
proportional to GDP), and Xit is the vector of all control variables, namely, GDP per capita growth, 
military expenditure to GDP ratio, debt servicing as a proportion of gross national income (GNI), and 
population growth. In the above equation, uit comprises both time-invariant unobserved country- 
specific effects (fixed effects) ei, and a time-variant unobserved component ʋit.
On the political side, in accordance with the literature on the determinants of social sector 
expenditure, we incorporate the degree of democracy, as democracies are more likely to spend on 
social welfare. This may be all the more important following the second wave of democratization 
following the end of the Cold War. We deployed the well-known hybrid Polity 2 combined scores of 
democracies (ranging from 0 at the bottom end to 10 for perfect democracies) and autocracy 
(extending from −10 for the worst to 0). An alternative measure of democracy is the V-DEM data 
on democracy and egalitarianism; see Coppedge et al. (2016). This data shows much greater 
variation and has the advantage of a variety of sub-components which are fine grained to capture 
more aspects of democracy. In particular, it separates a liberal democracy index from the electoral 
democracy index. While elections are common in most developing countries respect for liberal 
values are less common. The V-DEM electoral democracy index plays close attention to aspects of 
electoral fairness and freedom of expression. The separate liberal democracy index and is concerned 
with judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, as well as respect for human rights and 
equality before the law. These two indicators of democracy do not always move together, especially 
in recent times. In addition, V-DEM also provides us with the participatory (direct participation by 
civil society, for example) and deliberative democracy (degree of consultation) index. It is also 
important to examine the effect of institutional quality, as this could have an impact on social sector 
expenditure. To this end, indicators of the quality of government, which is the mean value of the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) variables corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality, 
scaled 0–1, is taken, with a higher value indicating improved governance (see Dahlberg et al. 2013 for 
details). Our second model can be expressed as follows. 
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Yit ¼ β0 þ β1Fit þ β2Pit þ β3Xit þ uit 2ð Þ
In equation (2), Pit represents the polity, V-DEM liberal, electoral, participatory, deliberative and 
egalitarian indices and quality of government variable, run in separate models as alternative 
estimates of each other.
Arguably, an important determinant of social sector spending is inequality, as discussed in the 
preceding section. Social sector spending redresses inequality, but current inequality (rather than 
past inequality) may reflect societal or the ruling class attitudes to inequality: a more inequality- 
averse society may engage in greater social spending. We utilize three independent variables to 
capture income inequality. In particular, we employ both a Gini and a Palma ratio Index taken from 
the Global Income Dataset (GID) included within the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP). 
It is computed through coefficients of equalized household disposable income. The GID dataset 
offers Gini coefficients for the vast majority of countries in the world (more than 160) for every year 
for more than half a century (1960–2015). We also use egalitarian democracy index as a different 
measure of inequality taken from V-DEM, which is a broad measure of equal protection, access to and 
distribution of resources. It does not focus strictly on income, but has health and education inequal-
ities built in. To capture the effect of inequality, we include an inequality variable in the third model 
after controlling for explanatory and control variables. Furthermore, introducing an inequality 
variable in the base model shows how society’s attitude towards inequality affects the role of fiscal 
capacity on social welfare spending. We can show this model in the following way. In equation (3), Iit 
represents the inequality variable in the form of either the Gini coefficient, Palma ratio or egalitarian 
measures, which are run in separate models as alternative estimates of each other. 
Yit ¼ β0 þ β1Fit þ β2Iit þ β3Xit þ uit 3ð Þ
Econometric Methods
As a natural starting point for panel data analysis, we begin our estimation applying pooled ordinary 
least square (OLS) methods to the above specification. The advantage of using pooled OLS is that it 
uses more information by combining cross-sectional and time-series observations to get more 
reliable estimates of the parameters compared to cross-sectional OLS. Pooled OLS provides unbiased 
and consistent estimates as long as the composite error term uit is uncorrelated with Xit. However, 
the presence of unobserved time-invariant country-specific characteristics or fixed effects ei in the 
composite error term uit makes it likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables. This problem 
can be mitigated by employing a fixed effects (FE) technique, which removes the unobserved 
country-specific heterogeneity by within-transformation effects. However, the FE model eliminates 
a significant amount of the variation of the explanatory variables leading to measurement errors.
We now turn to the potential problem of endogeneity to estimate the causal effect of fiscal 
capacity on social spending expenditure. The presence of endogeneity makes regression estimates 
a measure of only the magnitude of association rather than the magnitude and direction of 
causation. Fiscal capacity measured by total non-resource tax to GDP ratio is likely to be endogenous 
for three possible reasons: reverse causality between fiscal capacity and social sector expenditure, 
model misspecification or omitted variables, and measurement errors. There is a possibility that fiscal 
capacity and social spending expenditure are jointly determined by some other factors. An instru-
mental variable (IV) technique should be used, and we estimate a two-stage generalized method of 
moments (IV/GMM2S) model.
To deal with the endogeneity of fiscal capacity, we use the share of agriculture in GDP and the 
share of natural resource rents in GDP as two instruments in our analysis. Successful implementation 
of the IV method relies on three identifying assumptions. The first is instruments’ relevance or 
a strong first stage. That is, selected instruments must be highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable. Second, instruments must be exogenous, which means they are uncorrelated with the error 
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term. This is also known as testing for over-identifying restrictions. Finally, instruments must meet 
exclusion restrictions, which means that instruments do not appear as separate regressors in 
the second stage regression. In summary, we can say that valid, relevant and strong instruments 
affect the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable. Both of these variables are 
highly correlated with fiscal capacity, the latter (natural resource rents) contributes positively to 
revenues, whereas the former may have an adverse effect on revenues if land taxes are low or 
avoided. Our argument is that the share of agriculture in GDP is largely unrelated to social sector 
expenditure, whereas resource rents are related to such expenditure only in highly autocratic states 
without representative government (Ross 2012). The identifying assumptions of these instruments 
are tested using available statistical tests (the Kleibergen–Paap Wald test, the Cragg–Donald 
F-statistic, the Sargan–Hansen test, etc.) and relevantly discussed in the following results section. 
In all our models, standard errors are country-cluster corrected robust standard errors.
In line with Gebregziabher and Niño-Zarazúa (2014) and Chiripanhura and Niño-Zarazúa (2015), 
we have conducted several robustness checks to test the validity of our findings. This includes 
alternative sample analysis (restricting the sample to low- and middle-income countries and less 
democratic countries), using alternative measures/data sources for fiscal capacity and use of alter-
native estimators. According to Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2004), Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) and Continuously Updating Estimator (CUE) tend to perform better 
than IV methods in the presence of weak instruments. So, we estimate both LIML and CUE to correct 
for finite sample bias in IV method. Apart from LIML and CUE, we have also used Fuller’s modified 
LIML in our robustness analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our study sample. It suggests that there is an increase 
between 1995 and 2010 in the average share of national income devoted to social protection, 
education expenditure, although the country coverage for the latter year is greater. There is also 
a slight increase in the average fiscal or revenue capacity. The burden of debt servicing also appears 
to have declined. Compared to 1995, the degree of democracy has increased in 2010, as indicated by 
various VDEM measures of democracy. The Polity indicator also suggests the march of democracy. 
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable
1995 2010
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Social protection expenditure to GDP ratio 4.491 3.909 6.549 4.458
Government expenditure on education to GDP ratio 3.581 1.373 4.36 1.542
Total non-resource tax to GDP ratio 13.328 6.473 16.598 7.163
Total tax to GDP ratio (WDI) 4.491 3.909 17.213 7.184
Total tax to GDP ratio (GFS) 3.581 1.373 14.279 5.976
Direct taxes to GDP ratio (GRD) 5.015 1.628 7.099 4.686
Income tax to GDP ratio (GRD) 13.328 6.473 5.333 2.821
Military expenditure to GDP ratio 2.034 1.358 1.708 1.174
Population growth (%) 1.965 1.649 1.728 1.099
Per capita GDP (constant price of year 2005) 1.673 7.118 5.123 2.534
Debt servicing to GNI ratio 5.462 5.401 4.021 5.999
Electoral democracy 0.469 0.194 0.509 0.183
Liberal democracy 0.311 0.183 0.346 0.183
Participatory democracy 0.274 0.139 0.31 0.141
Deliberative democracy 0.316 0.202 0.361 0.205
Egalitarian index 0.308 0.153 0.341 0.154
Polity 1.325 6.044 2.966 5.604
GINI 0.53 0.089 0.518 0.079
Note: (1) WDI- World Development Indicators 2019. (2) GFS -Government Financial Statistics 2019. (3) GRD- Government Revenue 
Dataset 2019. Source: Authors’ calculation based on panel dataset.
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There is little discernible change in the quality of governance and standard GINI and Palma ratio 
measures of inequality, but the VDEM index of egalitarianism has risen.
Figure 1 illustrates bivariate relationships between social welfare expenditure, fiscal capacity 
(Total non-resource tax to GDP ratio) as well as the degree of electoral democracy. As seen in 
Figure 1, a positive relationship between the three social spending measures and fiscal capacity and 
between social spending and the degree of electoral democracy.
Results
Before presenting the regression results, we discuss the justification for using share of agriculture in 
GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP as our instruments for fiscal capacity. First, 
F-statistics of the Cragg–Donald test of weak identification well exceeds the rule of thumb value (10) 
in all models where IV/GMM2S is employed. The finite-sample corrections of this test, the 
Kleibergen–Paap Wald statistic, also easily exceeds conventional critical values. This suggests the 
Figure 1. Relationship of fiscal capacity and democracy with social welfare outcomes.
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strong partial correlation between the included endogenous variable and the excluded instruments 
in our study. The first-stage results (not reported here) suggest that our instruments are individually 
correlated with fiscal capacity. The null hypothesis of zero correlation between the instruments and 
fiscal capacity in Kleibergen–Paap rk LM under-identification test is also strongly rejected. Finally, the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that the validity of the instruments cannot be 
rejected. These indicate that the instruments have a strong association with fiscal capacity but are 
not significantly correlated with social expenditure once the relevant explanatory variables are 
controlled for, which endorses the validity of our specifications.
The estimation results of the baseline model in equation (1) are presented in Table 3. We report 
results for three types of models, our preferred approach is IV/GMM2S. The estimated coefficients 
show consistent support for a positive and significant effect of fiscal capacity on all categories of 
public expenditure. According to the results shown in column (3) and (6) of Table 3, if there is an 
increase in fiscal capacity by 1%, social protection expenditure increases by 0.387 percentage points 
and education expenditure increases by 0.192 percentage points, respectively. This suggests that 
fiscal capacity is important in sustaining social welfare spending.
We now turn to discuss the implication of findings for the control variables. We find that military 
spending has a mostly insignificant effect except in column (2) where the fixed effect is employed. 
We found that military expenditure crowds out total social protection expenditures but not educa-
tion expenditure. This suggests that military expenditures reduce the capacity of government to 
direct expenditures to social welfare outcomes, except education.
We also find that the debt servicing variable has negative and significant effect on total social 
protection as shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. The coefficient on population growth is 
negative and significant on total social protection expenditure. As indicated earlier, this may be due 
to the fact that a growing population leads to an increase in national income, but social spending 
Table 3. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes.
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Regression method 
Independent variable
OLS 
(1)
FE 
(2)
IV/GMM2S 
(3)
OLS 
(4)
FE 
(5)
IV/GMM2S 
(6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.302*** 0.214*** 0.387*** 0.085*** 0.121*** 0.192**
(0.056) (0.060) (0.115) (0.021) (0.022) (0.085)
Military expenditure to GDP Ratio 0.045 −0.221** −0.115 −0.030 0.053 0.065
(0.172) (0.103) (0.175) (0.080) (0.079) (0.095)
GDP growth 0.050 0.054* 0.013 −0.005 −0.002 −0.012
(0.055) (0.030) (0.040) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
Pop growth −1.007*** −0.542*** −0.463*** 0.074 −0.096 −0.062
(0.252) (0.184) (0.166) (0.108) (0.074) (0.071)
Debt service to GNI ratio 0.007 −0.107*** −0.118*** 0.031 −0.012 −0.006
(0.039) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.009) (0.013)
Constant 2.253* 3.796*** 2.423*** 2.256***
(1.170) (1.010) (0.486) (0.397)
Observations 363 363 346 312 312 295
R-squared 0.475 0.272 0.198 0.146 0.149 0.103
Country FE × √ √ × √ √
Number of countries 84 84 81 82 82 75
Cragg-Donald F-stat 18.90 11.47
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 9.559 6.513
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 10.86 9.372
Hansen test (p-value) 0.697 0.823
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) OLS, 
ordinary least squares; FE, fixed-effects; IV/GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S 
models are implemented in the xtivreg2 package for Stata16.1. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of 
agriculture in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater 
than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor (fiscal capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This 
suggests they are strong and valid instruments for fiscal capacity.
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may not be rising in proportion; in some instances, per capita income and the revenues of the state 
do not rise in proportion to population growth. The coefficient of per capita GDP growth is positive, 
and significant in the fixed effects estimate (column 2). This means that growing mean income leads 
to greater social protection spending, which is why richer countries have proportionately bigger 
governments.
If we exclude grants from our measure of fiscal capacity the main results described above, 
especially with respect to fiscal capacity, remain unchanged (see Table A.6). This is also true when 
we alter our definition of fiscal capacity to other measures and data sources (see Table A.5) with one 
exception, for education expenditure using data from the World Bank. Direct taxes, in particular, 
positively and significantly contribute to all types of public expenditure (Table A.5). When we utilise 
the V-DEM indices of democracy in Table 4 involving electoral democracy, liberal democracy, 
deliberative democracy and participatory democracy the results are statistically significant. The 
degree of democracy is positively related to total social protection, as well as education spending. 
This finding is in line with the literature that, in general, greater democracy promotes higher social 
sector spending. In our robustness tests for alternative measures of institutions, when we try the 
alternative and widely used Polity measure of democracy the results are significant for total social 
protection expenditure, but not education spending (Table A.4). If we exclude grants from our 
measure of fiscal capacity in Table 4 described above, our results remain unchanged (see Table A.7)
Table 4. Impact of fiscal capacity and each of the four democratic-institution measures on social welfare outcomes. IV/GMM2S 
Estimate.
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.451*** 0.452*** 0.420*** 0.466*** 0.159** 0.163** 0.092 0.157**
(0.138) (0.137) (0.146) (0.138) (0.066) (0.067) (0.074) (0.065)
Military expenditure to GDP Ratio 0.022 0.027 0.047 0.021 0.124 0.123 0.096 0.123
(0.165) (0.164) (0.156) (0.169) (0.084) (0.084) (0.075) (0.084)
GDP growth 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.008
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Pop growth −0.378** −0.360* −0.386** −0.345* −0.103 −0.089 −0.148** −0.089
(0.191) (0.187) (0.186) (0.189) (0.081) (0.080) (0.076) (0.079)
Debt service to GNI Ratio −0.101*** −0.103*** −0.109*** −0.106*** 0.000 −0.002 −0.004 −0.001
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Electoral democracy 3.260*** 1.891**
(1.232) (0.947)
Liberal democracy 4.190*** 2.146*
(1.383) (1.161)
Participatory democracy 5.010** 4.453***
(2.299) (1.300)
Deliberative democracy 2.229** 1.801**
(1.136) (0.804)
Observations 327 327 329 327 279 279 282 279
R-squared 0.272 0.276 0.295 0.253 0.174 0.173 0.235 0.180
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 77 77 78 77 71 71 72 71
Cragg-Donald F-stat 19.04 19.51 17.29 19.43 15.27 15.83 11.89 15.38
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.08 11.29 9.922 11.01 7.068 7.288 5.509 7.002
Kleibergen-Paap LM 12.49 12.51 11.43 12.40 9.729 9.919 9.267 9.550
Hansen test (p-value) 0.817 0.795 0.809 0.753 0.367 0.393 0.160 0.395
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) IV/ 
GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S models are implemented in the xtivreg2 
package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of natural 
resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the 
over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that the 
three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (fiscal capacity) and that they are not 
directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for 
Fiscal capacity.
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The other macroeconomic covariates remain largely unchanged from the baseline estimations in 
Table 3. Thus, as indicated earlier, fiscal capacity is not the only determinant of social sector 
expenditure, other political factors are also relevant. We also tried out the impact of governance 
measured by the composite quality of government index (Table A.4). The results indicated a positive, 
but statistically insignificant contribution of governance to social welfare spending. Hence, we may 
infer that the degree of democracy is more important than governance in determining the extent of 
social welfare expenditure. This, however, leaves open the question regarding the quality of social 
sector provision, which is beyond the scope of our paper; the quality of services may be related to 
the standards of governance. The sign and significance of the other covariates are largely same as 
before.
We now turn our attention on the role of inequality in social spending, as this is an indication of 
society’s attitudes towards aversion to current inequality. We find that income inequality in the form 
of the Gini coefficient has a negative and insignificant effect on both total social protection 
expenditure and education spending, as is shown in column (2) and (5) of Table 5. We also employed 
the Palma ratio in place of the Gini coefficient; the results indicate that income inequality in the form 
of Palma ratio has a negative and significant effect on total social protection (column (3) of Table 5). 
When we utilise the V-DEM egalitarian index the coefficients are positive and significant (columns 1 
and 4 of Table 5). When grants are excluded from the fiscal capacity definition the Palma ratio 
mentioned above becomes insignificant, and the egalitarian component index from VDEM becomes 
insignificant only for education expenditure but retains its significance for total social protection 
expenditure (see Table A.8).
Table 5. Impact of fiscal capacity and each of the three inequality measures on social welfare outcomes. IV/GMM2S Estimate.
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.446*** 0.529*** 0.541*** 0.148** 0.192*** 0.197***
(0.148) (0.134) (0.138) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio 0.015 −0.036 −0.021 0.120 0.108 0.111
(0.165) (0.196) (0.195) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
GDP growth 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.011 −0.003 −0.004
(0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Pop growth −0.359* −0.303* −0.296 −0.100 −0.068 −0.063
(0.195) (0.182) (0.182) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079)
Debt service to GNI Ratio −0.105*** −0.099*** −0.099*** −0.001 −0.004 −0.005
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Egalitarian index 4.414** 2.969**
(2.229) (1.508)
GINI −0.671 −0.581
(3.825) (2.229)
Palma ratio −0.137* −0.038
(0.079) (0.030)
Observations 327 339 339 279 290 290
R-squared 0.275 0.088 0.082 0.185 0.118 0.116
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 77 80 80 71 74 74
Cragg-Donald F-stat 17.75 23.01 21.85 14.18 18.20 17.37
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.87 14.02 13.41 6.608 9.324 9.092
Kleibergen-Paap LM 12.40 13.81 13.20 9.421 12.08 11.64
Hansen test (p-value) 0.853 0.745 0.790 0.346 0.310 0.306
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) IV/ 
GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S models are implemented in the xtivreg2 
package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of natural 
resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the 
over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that the 
three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal Policy) and that they are not 
directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for 
Fiscal capacity
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This suggests that social sector spending as a proportion of national income is higher in more 
egalitarian societies. Societies with a greater inequality tolerance may become immune to the 
suffering of the poor, and systematically spend less in alleviating poverty and redressing inequality, 
as pointed out in Gassman, Mohnen, and Vinci (2016). This may be especially so when the gap in 
income (and wealth) of the super-rich widens in relation to both the poor and middle classes. The 
size of the coefficient on fiscal capacity is larger than before, suggesting that fiscal capacity plays an 
important role in determining the extent of social welfare in inequality-averse societies. The other 
covariates retain their earlier sign and significance.
Robustness Analysis
Since our sample consists of upper middle income, middle income, lower middle income and low- 
income developing countries, the effect of fiscal capacity on social sector spending may be large and 
significant. So, we truncate our sample to include only low- and middle-income countries to exclude 
more affluent (upper-middle income) countries in this step of robustness check. We find that the 
impact of fiscal capacity on social spending is still positive and significant across all models (Table 
A.1). We find similar results by excluding more democratic countries with a polity score of 6 and 
above (see Table A.2). It must be noted that democracy still contributes positively and significantly to 
social spending even in less democratic nations. Alternative estimators also provide similar findings 
(see Tables A.3). Finally, using a set of alternative measures and data sources for fiscal capacity does 
not largely alter our findings (see Table A.5), except fiscal capacity becomes insignificant for educa-
tion spending when utilising World Bank data. Therefore, robustness analyses suggest that the 
results for the full sample hold in sub-samples and is consistent irrespective to the use of different 
estimators.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that the most robust explanatory variable for social spending variables is fiscal 
capacity measured as total tax revenues as share of GDP, which is invariably significant with 
a positive sign. Our results suggest that a 1% increase in fiscal capacity (as a percentage share of 
GDP) increases social protection spending (% GDP) by 0.387 percentage points and increases 
education expenditure (% GDP) by 0.192 percentage points, respectively. After that, the military 
expenditure tens to crowd out only one type of the social welfare expenditures (i.e. social protection 
spending). As far as public education expenditure is concerned, there may be some positive 
complementarities between the two. The burden of external debt servicing almost always (in the 
panel data estimations) exerts a negative and significant impact on social sector spending. Higher 
per capita income growth also has a positive and significant impact on the three types of social 
spending in nearly all of our panel data type estimations. Taken together, these findings reinforce 
our intuition that richer countries with a greater fiscal capacity can afford more social sector 
expenditure. Population growth invariably has a negative and significant impact on social expendi-
ture as a proportion of national income.
Fiscal capacity is necessary, but not sufficient, in determining the extent of social welfare 
expenditure. As hypothesized, greater democracy promotes more social welfare expenditure, as it 
leads to the greater realization of median voter preferences for more social welfare. More democratic 
nations, on an average, care more about the poor or the middle classes, who are the chief 
beneficiaries of certain types of social sector expenditure in developing countries. The rising tide 
of social sector spending in developing countries over the last two decades has also been accom-
panied by a movement from autocracy to (imperfect and electoral) democracy in the developing 
world. Interestingly, good governance, despite its positive impact on social sector spending, is 
mainly insignificant, suggesting that as far as the determinants of expenditure are concerned, 
a democratic polity rather than good governance is more important. This leaves an open question 
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as to the quality of social provision, as well as specific societal preferences of the type of social sector 
spending which may be more closely related to good governance.
Our paper also employs income inequality as a determinant (or control variable in the determination) 
of social sector expenditure. We utilize Gini coefficients of inequality and the Palma ratio of the shares of 
the rich relative to the poor, as well as the V-DEM egalitarian index which is the most significant. The 
more egalitarian the society, the greater the degree of social welfare, suggesting that the increased 
separation of the poor and middle classes from the rich and super-rich is not propitious for these types 
of public spending. The extent of social welfare in inequality-averse societies is constrained by fiscal 
capacity. The presence of conflict in the form of either civil war or war can exert upward pressures to 
bring about social sector expenditure, but this effect is not statistically significant.
As far as the policy implications are concerned, efforts to promote greater social sector spending 
should aim at debt relief and greater fiscal capacity. On the institutional side, greater democracy, 
especially greater democracy in conjunction with fiscal capacity, promotes this type of spending.
Besides alleviating absolute and grinding poverty, social welfare can help to redress the harmful 
effects of inequality, particularly inequality of opportunity, which is arguably the great scourge of our 
time. As indicated in our literature review, inequality has also become growth retarding during recent 
times, and social sector expenditures do not appear to crowd out growth prospects. Enhanced fiscal 
capacity is key to the goal of greater social welfare spending, and in this connection, it is crucial to be 
able to increase taxation of the ultra-rich and the multinational corporate sector, who both adroitly and 
through political clout avoiding their fair share of tax. Otherwise, all efforts in the direction of greater 
justice with increased prosperity for the majority will, like faith without charity, come to nothing.
Notes
1. As far as developing countries are concerned, there was a greater consensus, until recently, about the need to 
reduce poverty via ‘pro-poor’ growth relative to the importance attached to lowering inequality; see, for 
example, remarks made by Anne Krueger of the IMF in 2002 (https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
2002/092602a.htm, accessed on 14 January 2015).
2. This is because the extremely wealthy demand a high return to their financial investments, and the financial debt 
burden of the relatively poor, if securitized, can make economies more prone to financial crises, which in turn 
can cause major recessions.
3. Inequality between distinct ethnic groups, a concept known as horizontal inequality, can be a major cause of 
civil war; see, for example, Murshed (2010: chapter 3).
4. The growing share of wealth relative to national income, according to Piketty (2014), resulting in the functional 
distribution of income becoming less favourable to labour, is central to these developments.
5. Table B.1 gives details of our data sources and Table B.2 gives the list of countries in our sample.
6. Their study is a cross-sectional analysis, whereas our analysis is a panel covering the 1990 to 2010 period.
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Table A1. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Regression method 
Independent variable
OLS 
(1)
FE 
(2)
IV/GMM2S 
(3)
OLS 
(4)
FE 
(5)
IV/GMM2S 
(6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.228** 0.214*** 0.571** 0.136*** 0.146*** 0.245***
(0.110) (0.064) (0.235) (0.031) (0.026) (0.083)
Military expenditure to GDP Ratio 0.056 −0.101 0.200 0.010 0.093 0.204**
(0.130) (0.090) (0.152) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
GDP growth 0.053 0.048 −0.032 −0.007 0.017 0.011
(0.074) (0.031) (0.061) (0.029) (0.014) (0.020)
Pop growth −0.883*** −0.223 0.017 0.058 −0.074 −0.025
(0.319) (0.175) (0.210) (0.145) (0.063) (0.069)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.070 −0.156*** −0.147*** −0.011 −0.012 −0.006
(0.046) (0.038) (0.036) (0.023) (0.011) (0.029)
Constant 2.839** 2.250** 1.836** 1.745***
(1.360) (1.038) (0.691) (0.468)
Observations 229 229 214 205 205 191
R-squared 0.302 0.293 0.002 0.231 0.209 0.140
Country FE × √ √ × √ √
Number of countries 55 55 52 54 54 49
Cragg-Donald F-stat 4.090 5.469
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 3.007 2.936
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 6.301 6.622
Hansen test (p-value) 0.231 0.0888
Notes: (1)Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) OLS, 
ordinary least squares; FE, fixed-effects; IV/GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S 
models are implemented in the xtivreg2 package for Stata16.1. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of 
agriculture in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater 
than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor (Fiscal capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This 
suggests they are strong and valid instruments for Fiscal capacity.
18 S. M. MURSHED ET AL.
Table A2. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes in less democratic countries.
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Regression method 
Independent variable
OLS 
(1)
FE 
(2)
IV/GMM2S 
(3)
OLS 
(4)
FE 
(5)
IV/GMM2S 
(6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.211*** 0.148** 0.360* 0.112*** 0.121*** 0.255***
(0.068) (0.056) (0.194) (0.024) (0.022) (0.098)
Military expenditure to GDP Ratio 0.260* −0.099 0.119 0.029 0.053 0.029
(0.150) (0.082) (0.132) (0.076) (0.079) (0.094)
GDP growth 0.089* 0.062* 0.027 −0.013 −0.002 −0.028**
(0.053) (0.035) (0.064) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)
Pop growth −0.601** −0.351* −0.317 0.128 −0.096 0.019
(0.242) (0.208) (0.205) (0.089) (0.074) (0.045)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.005 −0.199*** −0.203*** 0.081*** −0.012 −0.009
(0.050) (0.064) (0.058) (0.023) (0.009) (0.052)
Constant 1.571 3.770*** 1.495*** 2.256***
(1.377) (1.097) (0.494) (0.397)
Observations 210 210 189 178 312 157
R-squared 0.366 0.323 0.294 0.404 0.186 0.243
Country FE × √ √ × √ √
Number of countries 64 64 51 62 82 46
Cragg-Donald F-stat 7.395 5.374
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 3.488 2.661
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 6.006 3.308
Hansen test (p-value) 0.979 0.845
Notes: (1)Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) OLS, 
ordinary least squares; FE, fixed-effects; IV/GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S 
models are implemented in the xtivreg2 package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of 
agriculture in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater 
than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor (Fiscal capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This 
suggests they are strong and valid instruments for Fiscal capacity.
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Table A4. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes (Alternative measure of political institutions).
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (4) (5)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.420*** 0.430** 0.112 0.116
(0.149) (0.176) (0.114) (0.098)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio 0.004 −0.340 −0.251 −0.173
(0.161) (0.281) (0.171) (0.129)
GDP growth −0.420** −0.565** 0.060 −0.117
(0.209) (0.237) (0.078) (0.144)
Pop growth 0.019 0.079 0.019 0.016
(0.042) (0.058) (0.023) (0.027)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.069* −0.081*** −0.057** −0.039**
(0.037) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017)
Polity 0.116** 0.031
(0.051) (0.022)
icrg_qog 0.535 −0.030
(1.301) (0.785)
Observations 323 271 286 238
R-squared 0.230 0.250 0.170 0.165
Country FE × √ × √
Number of countries 76 63 76 63
Cragg-Donald F-stat 15.18 9.875 16.49 10.30
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8.438 6.339 7.548 4.865
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 10.20 8.540 10.44 8.458
Hansen test (p-value) 0.721 0.745 0.553 0.863
Notes: (1)Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) OLS, 
ordinary least squares; FE, fixed-effects; IV/GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S 
models are implemented in the xtivreg2 package for Stata16.1. (4) Instrumental variables for all models are share of agriculture 
in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and 
Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are 
exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal 
capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are 
strong and valid instruments for Fiscal capacity.
Table A3. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes (Alternative IV estimators).
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Regression method 
Independent variable
CUE 
(1)
LIMI 
(2)
Fuller 
(3)
CUE 
(4)
LIMI 
(5)
Fuller 
(6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP Ratio 0.529*** 0.518*** 0.512*** 0.143 0.155 0.154
(0.139) (0.141) (0.138) (0.092) (0.099) (0.097)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio −0.037 −0.041 −0.043 −0.260 −0.257 −0.257
(0.196) (0.195) (0.194) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169)
GDP growth −0.303* −0.303* −0.308* 0.108 0.116 0.116
(0.183) (0.183) (0.182) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Pop growth 0.022 0.020 0.021 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.099*** −0.101*** −0.101*** −0.039** −0.039** −0.039**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 339 339 339 301 301 301
R-squared 0.087 0.100 0.107 0.140 0.134 0.134
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
Cragg-Donald F-stat 21.06 21.06 21.06 24.46 24.46 24.46
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12.69 12.69 12.69 12.43 12.43 12.43
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 12.96 12.96 12.96 13.28 13.28 13.28
Hansen test (p-value) 0.749 0.746 0.744 0.647 0.654 0.653
Notes: (1)Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) CUE, 
continuously-updated estimator; LIML, Limited Information Maximum Likelihood; Fuller, Fuller’s modified LIML estimator. (4) 
Instrumental variables for all models are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first- 
stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails 
to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently 
correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the 
dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for Fiscal capacity.
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Table A5. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes (alternative measure of fiscal capacity).
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP) Expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fiscal Capacity: Alternative Measures
Total tax to GDP ratio (WDI) 0.537** 0.074
(0.213) (0.067)
Total tax to GDP ratio (GFS) 0.464*** 0.154**
(0.123) (0.060)
Direct taxes to GDP ratio (GRD) 0.841*** 0.287***
(0.222) (0.104)
Income tax to GDP ratio (GRD) 0.717*** 0.307***
(0.178) (0.116)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio −0.245 −0.085 −0.092 −0.327** 0.122 0.094 0.081 −0.025
(0.304) (0.219) (0.203) (0.164) (0.129) (0.097) (0.097) (0.092)
GDP growth 0.156*** 0.016 0.031 0.066* 0.004 0.004 −0.004 0.003
(0.047) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Pop growth −1.003** −0.252 −0.260 −0.429** −0.156 −0.087 −0.075 −0.145
(0.425) (0.194) (0.202) (0.172) (0.129) (0.083) (0.083) (0.097)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.126*** −0.105*** −0.080*** −0.084*** −0.016 −0.003 −0.000 −0.003
(0.048) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Observations 200 339 318 322 163 290 276 282
R-squared 0.065 0.081 −0.103 0.042 0.086 0.093 0.037 −0.027
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 64 80 77 77 54 74 71 73
Cragg-Donald F-stat 9.689 21.27 16.43 24.03 20.18 19.27 14.16 17.98
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.762 13.49 14.88 14.97 15.77 5.363 7.364 11.18
Kleibergen-Paap LM 11.41 13.80 14.02 14.08 6.309 10.02 12.07 12.35
Hansen test (p-value) 0.705 0.605 0.778 0.542 0.457 0.102 0.154 0.172
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) IV/ 
GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S models are implemented in the xtivreg2 
package for Stata16.1. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of 
natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of 
the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that 
the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal capacity and that they are 
not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for 
Fiscal capacity. (5) WDI- World Development Indicators 2019. (6) GFS -Government Financial Statistics 2019. (7) GRD- 
Government Revenue Dataset 2019
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Table A6. Impact of fiscal capacity on social welfare outcomes (excluding grants from fiscal capacity).
Dependent variable
Social protection expenditure (% 
of GDP)
Expenditure on education (% of 
GDP)
Regression method 
Independent variable
OLS 
(1)
FE 
(2)
IV/ 
GMM2S 
(3)
OLS 
(4)
FE 
(5)
IV/GMM2S 
(6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP ratio excluding grants 0.278*** 0.172*** 0.363*** 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.203**
(0.052) (0.052) (0.107) (0.019) (0.023) (0.096)
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 0.059 −0.226** −0.124 −0.019 0.042 0.072
(0.164) (0.109) (0.221) (0.078) (0.083) (0.111)
GDP growth 0.060 0.063** 0.023 −0.002 0.003 −0.011
(0.052) (0.027) (0.038) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
Pop growth −0.953*** −0.577*** −0.468*** 0.077 −0.103 −0.036
(0.257) (0.181) (0.170) (0.110) (0.083) (0.087)
Debt service 0.002 −0.110*** −0.127*** 0.030 −0.013 −0.016
(0.038) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011)
Constant 2.879*** 4.720*** 2.660*** 2.802***
(1.075) (0.820) (0.444) (0.409)
Observations 363 363 346 312 312 295
R-squared 0.397 0.230 0.114 0.333 0.186 0.167
Country FE × √ √ × √ √
Number of countries 84 84 81 82 82 75
Cragg-Donald F-stat 17.18 8.153
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.76 5.257
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 13.68 8.950
Hansen test (p-value) 0.671 0.831
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. (3) OLS, 
ordinary least squares; FE, fixed-effects; IV/GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S 
models are implemented in the xtivreg2 package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of 
agriculture in GDP and the share of natural resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater 
than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. This indicate that the three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor (Fiscal capacity) and that they are not directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This 
suggests they are strong and valid instruments for Fiscal capacity.
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Table A7. Impact of fiscal capacity and each of the four democratic-institution measures on social welfare outcomes. IV/GMM2S 
Estimate. (excluding grants from fiscal capacity).
Dependent variable Social protection expenditure (% of GDP)
Expenditure on education (% of 
GDP)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP ratio 
excluding grants
0.430*** 0.439*** 0.389*** 0.449*** 0.179** 0.185** 0.103 0.178**
(0.139) (0.141) (0.136) (0.141) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) (0.082)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio 0.036 0.038 0.084 0.035 0.133 0.132 0.104 0.132
(0.220) (0.222) (0.197) (0.228) (0.101) (0.102) (0.088) (0.101)
GDP growth 0.041 0.042 0.033 0.043 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.009
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Pop growth −0.381* −0.351* −0.404** −0.338* −0.068 −0.052 −0.126 −0.055
(0.196) (0.201) (0.186) (0.202) (0.097) (0.099) (0.086) (0.097)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.107*** −0.111*** −0.116*** −0.114*** −0.008 −0.011 −0.009 −0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Electoral democracy 4.066*** 1.868*
(1.366) (0.969)
Liberal democracy 4.600*** 1.872
(1.551) (1.155)
Participatory democracy 7.073*** 4.434***
(2.341) (1.277)
Deliberative democracy 2.712** 1.632**
(1.288) (0.811)
Observations 327 327 329 327 279 279 282 279
R-squared 0.209 0.199 0.255 0.175 0.089 0.078 0.205 0.092
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 77 77 78 77 71 71 72 71
Cragg-Donald F-stat 15.63 15.74 14.61 15.83 9.860 10.08 7.396 9.767
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.33 10.35 10.16 10.18 4.699 4.684 3.942 4.529
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 10.72 10.65 10.77 10.62 7.485 7.508 7.589 7.205
Hansen test (p-value) 0.769 0.795 0.428 0.831 0.352 0.360 0.188 0.364
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) IV/ 
GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S models are implemented in the xtivreg2 
package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of natural 
resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the 
over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that the 
three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal Policy) and that they are not 
directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for 
Fiscal capacity
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Table A8. Impact of fiscal capacity and each of the three inequality measures on social welfare outcomes. IV/GMM2S Estimate. 
(excluding grants from fiscal capacity).
Dependent variable
Social protection expenditure (% of 
GDP)
Expenditure on education 
(% of GDP)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total non-resource taxes to GDP ratio excluding grants 0.445*** 0.523*** 0.531*** 0.171* 0.222*** 0.225***
(0.149) (0.143) (0.144) (0.095) (0.086) (0.087)
Military expenditure to GDP ratio 0.036 −0.023 −0.017 0.126 0.118 0.120
(0.222) (0.265) (0.266) (0.099) (0.108) (0.109)
GDP growth 0.050 0.047 0.047 0.013 −0.002 −0.003
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Pop growth −0.301 −0.280 −0.276 −0.050 −0.022 −0.020
(0.215) (0.206) (0.207) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099)
Debt service to GNI ratio −0.119*** −0.107*** −0.107*** −0.014 −0.014 −0.014
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Egalitarian index 6.906** 4.026
(3.086) (2.601)
GINI −0.019 −0.244
(3.986) (2.169)
Palma ratio −0.057 −0.012
(0.088) (0.041)
Observations 329 339 339 282 290 290
R-squared 0.190 −0.028 −0.039 0.104 −0.018 −0.024
Country FE √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of countries 78 80 80 72 74 74
Cragg-Donald F-stat 15.37 18.72 18.54 8.294 11.89 11.88
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 11.03 12.56 12.80 4.242 5.963 6.087
Kleibergen-Paap LM-stat 10.56 12.35 12.23 7.327 9.310 9.313
Hansen test (p-value) 0.623 0.818 0.805 0.271 0.304 0.306
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) IV/ 
GMM2S, two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. GMM2S models are implemented in the xtivreg2 
package for Stata. (4) Instrumental variables for models (3), (6), and (9) are share of agriculture in GDP and the share of natural 
resource rent in GDP. The first-stage F-tests (test of weak identification) is greater than 10 and Hansen J statistic (test of the 
over-identifying restrictions) fails to reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are exogenous. This indicate that the 
three instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor (Fiscal Policy) and that they are not 
directly correlated with the dependent variable (Social expenditure). This suggests they are strong and valid instruments for 
Fiscal capacity.
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Table B1. List of variables, definitions and sources.
Name and definition Source
Social protection expenditure is the sum of annual 
expenditure (including benefit expenditure and 
administration costs) of all existing public social security/ 
social protection schemes or programmes in the country. 
The scope of the indicators corresponds to the scope of the 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 
(No.102), which established nine classes of benefits: 
medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old- 
age benefit, employment injury benefit, family benefit, 
maternity benefit, invalidity benefit and survivors’ benefit, 
plus other income support and assistance programmes, 
including conditional cash transfers, available to the poor 
and not included under the above classes. It includes public 
health expenditure as well. It is expressed as a share of GDP 
in national currency units, current prices.
ILO, World Social Protection Report 2014/15
Government expenditure on education as % of GDP is 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
UNESCO, WDI
Fiscal capacity 
The main measure of fiscal capacity is total Non-resource Tax 
to GDP ratio. which consists of taxes, social security 
contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue mines 
resources taxes
UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 2019 https://www. 
wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Data/ICTDWIDERGRD_ 
2019.xlsx
Military expenditure as a share of GDP Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Polity 2 gives the combined autocracy and democracy score 
of between -10 and +10, with +10 being the best 
(democracy) and -10 the worst (autocracy).
Polity IV dataset: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (accessed 
1 December 2014)
Quality of government is an aggregation of mean value of 
the three variables; corruption, law and order, and 
bureaucracy quality scaled between 0 and 1. Higher values 
indicate higher quality of government. These three 
variables are originally generated by the ICRG dataset. The 
aggregate variable quality of government is constructed by 
the Quality of Government Standard Dataset 2016, Quality 
of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, 
Sweden.
Dahlberg, S., S. Holmberg, B. Rothstein, A. Khomenko, and 
R. Svensson (2016). The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, 
version Jan16. University of Gothenburg: Quality of 
Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se, 
doi:10.18157/QoGBasJan16
The V-DEM liberal democracy index has two components: the 
electoral democracy index and the liberal component 
index. The former is related to elections, the latter is 
concerned with constraints on the executive, human rights 
and equality before the law. The participatory component 
index is related to civil society engagement and the 
influence of sub-national governments. The egalitarian 
component index looks at equal protection, equal access 
and the equal distribution of resources.
https://www.v-dem.net/en/ 
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-8 (last accessed 
27 October 2019)
GINI coefficient of Estimated Household Income Inequality 
The Palma ratio is It is the share of income held by the top 
ten percent of the population divided by the share of the 
bottom forty percent.
the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP)
Debt service is total debt service is the sum of principal 
repayments and interest actually paid in currency, goods, or 
services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term 
debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the 
IMF. It is a percentage of GNI.
World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Population growth
Per capita income/GDP growth
Share of agriculture in GDP
Share of mineral resource rents in GDP
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Table B2. List of countries.
Country Name
Afghanistan El Salvador Nepal
Albania Ethiopia Nicaragua
Algeria Fiji Niger
Argentina Gambia, The Pakistan
Armenia Georgia Panama
Azerbaijan Ghana Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh Guatemala Paraguay
Belarus Guinea Peru
Belize Guinea-Bissau Philippines
Benin Guyana Romania
Bolivia Honduras Rwanda
Bosnia and Herzegovina India Senegal
Botswana Indonesia Sierra Leone
Brazil Jamaica South Africa
Bulgaria Jordan Sri Lanka
Burkina Faso Kenya Sudan
Burundi Kyrgyz Republic Swaziland
Cambodia Lao PDR Syrian Arab Republic
Cameroon Liberia Tajikistan
Central African Republic Madagascar Tanzania
Chad Malawi Thailand
China Malaysia Togo
Colombia Mauritania Tunisia
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mauritius Turkey
Congo, Rep. Mexico Uganda
Costa Rica Mongolia Ukraine
Cote d’Ivoire Morocco Uzbekistan
Dominican Republic Mozambique Venezuela, RB
Ecuador Myanmar Vietnam
Egypt, Arab Rep. Namibia Zambia
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